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Integrating costs and benefits is crucial for optimal decision-making. Although much is known about decisions that involve outcome-
related costs (e.g., delay, risk), many of our choices are attached to actions and require an evaluation of the associated motor costs. Yet
how the brain incorporates motor costs into choices remains largely unclear. We used human fMRI during choices involving monetary
reward and physical effort to identify brain regions that serve as a choice comparator for effort-reward trade-offs. By independently
varying both options’ effort and reward levels, we were able to identify the neural signature of a comparator mechanism. A network
involving supplementary motor area and the caudal portion of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex encoded the difference in reward (posi-
tively) and effort levels (negatively) between chosen and unchosen choice options.We next modeled effort-discounted subjective values
using a novel behavioral model. This revealed that the same network of regions involving dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and supple-
mentary motor area encoded the difference between the chosen and unchosen options’ subjective values, and that activity was best
described using a concave model of effort-discounting. In addition, this signal reflected how precisely value determined participants’
choices. By contrast, separate signals in supplementary motor area and ventromedial prefrontal cortex correlated with participants’
tendency to avoid effort and seek reward, respectively. This suggests that the critical neural signature of decision-making for choices
involvingmotor costs is found inhumancingulate cortex andnot ventromedial prefrontal cortex as typically reported for outcome-based
choice. Furthermore, distinct frontal circuits seem to drive behavior toward reward maximization and effort minimization.
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Introduction
Cost-benefit decisions are a central aspect of flexible goal-
directed behavior. One particularly well-studied neural system
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Significance Statement
Theneural processes that govern the trade-off betweenexpectedbenefits andmotor costs remain largelyunknown.This is striking
because energetic requirements play an integral role in our day-to-day choices and instrumental behavior, and a diminished
willingness to exert effort is a characteristic feature of a range of neurological disorders.We use a newbehavioral characterization
of how humans trade off reward maximization with effort minimization to examine the neural signatures that underpin such
choices, using BOLD MRI neuroimaging data. We find the critical neural signature of decision-making, a signal that reflects the
comparisonof value between choice options, in human cingulate cortex,whereas twodistinct brain circuits drive behavior toward
reward maximization or effort minimization.
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concerns choices where costs are tied to the reward outcomes
(e.g., risk, delay) (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Boorman et al.,
2009; Philiastides et al., 2010). Much less is known about choices
tied to physical effort costs, despite their ubiquitous presence in
human and animal behavior. The intrinsic relationship between
effort and action may engage neural circuits distinct from those
involved in other value-based choice computations.
There is growing consensus that different types of value-
guided decisions are underpinned by distinct neural systems,
depending on the type of information that needs to be pro-
cessed (e.g., Rudebeck et al., 2008; Camille et al., 2011b; Ken-
nerley et al., 2011; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011; Rushworth
et al., 2012). For example, activity in the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC) carries a signature of choice compar-
ison (chosen-unchosen value) for decisions between abstract
goods or when costs are tied to the outcome (Kable and Glim-
cher, 2007; Boorman et al., 2009; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Phili-
astides et al., 2010; Hunt et al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2012;
Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Strait et al., 2014). By contrast,
such value difference signals are found more dorsally in me-
dial frontal cortex when deciding between exploration versus
exploitation (Kolling et al., 2012).
Choices requiring the evaluation of physical effort rest on
representations of the required actions and their energetic costs,
and thus likely require an evaluation of the internal state of the
agent. This is distinct from choices based solely on reward out-
comes (Rangel and Hare, 2010). Indeed, the proposed network
for evaluating motor costs comprises brain regions involved in
action planning and execution, including the cingulate cortex,
putamen, and supplementary motor area (SMA) (Croxson et al.,
2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Pre´vost et al., 2010; Burke et al.,
2013; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Bonnelle et al., 2016). Neurons in
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) encode information about re-
wards, effort costs, and actions (Matsumoto et al., 2003; Kenner-
ley and Wallis, 2009; Luk and Wallis, 2009; Hayden and Platt,
2010), and integrate this information into an economic value
signal (Hillman and Bilkey, 2010; Hosokawa et al., 2013). More-
over, lesions to ACC profoundly impair choices of effortful op-
tions and between action values (Walton et al., 2003, 2006, 2009;
Schweimer andHauber, 2005; Kennerley et al., 2006; Rudebeck et
al., 2006, 2008; Camille et al., 2011b).
While these studies highlight the importance ofmotor-related
structures in representing effort information, it remains unclear
whether computations in these regions are indeed related to com-
paring effort values (or effort-discounted net values), the essen-
tial neural signature, which would implicate these areas in
decision making. Indeed, these regions could simply represent
effort, which is then passed onto other regions for value compar-
ison processes. A number of questions thus arise. First, is infor-
mation about reward and effort compared in separate neural
structures, or is this information fed to a region that compares
options based on their integrated value? Second, do regions that
preferably encode reward or effort have a direct influence on
determining choice? Finally, assuming separate neural systems
are present for influencing choices based on reward versus effort,
how does the brain arbitrate between these signals when reward
and effort information support opposing choices?
Here we used a task designed to identify signatures of a
choice comparison for effort-based decisions in humans using
fMRI and to test whether different neural circuits “drive”
choices toward reward maximization versus energy minimiza-
tion. We show that the neural substrates of effort-based choice
are distinct from those computing outcome-related choices:
well-known reward and effort circuits centered on vmPFC and
SMA bias choices to be more driven by benefits or motor costs,
respectively, with a region in cingulate cortex integrating cost
and benefit information and comparing options based on
these integrated subjective values.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Twenty-four participants with no history of psychiatric or
neurological disease, and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
took part in this study (mean age 28 1 years, age range 19–38 years, 11
females). All participants gave written informed consent and consent to
publish before the start of the experiment; the study was approved by the
local research ethics committee at University College London (1825/003)
and conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Partici-
pants were reimbursedwith £15 for their time; in addition, they accumu-
lated average winnings of £7.16 0.11 during each of the two blocks of
the task (the maximum winnings per block were scaled to £8; the result-
ing average total pay was £29.32). Three participants were excluded from
the analysis: one for failing to stay awake during scanning and two due to
excessive headmovements (summedmovement in any direction and run
40mm). All analyseswere performed on the remaining 21 participants.
Behavioral task. Participants received both written and oral task in-
structions. They were asked to make a series of choices between two
options, which independently varied in required grip force (effort) and
reward magnitude (see Fig. 1A). The reward magnitude was shown as a
number (range: 10–40 points; approximately corresponding to pence)
and required force levels were indicated as the height of a horizontal bar
(range: 20%–80% of the participant’s maximum grip force).
Each trial comprised an offer, response, and outcome phase; a subset
of 30% of trials also contained an effort production phase. During the
offer phase, participants decided which option to choose but they were
not yet able to indicate their response. There were two trial types (50%
each): ACT (action) and ABS (abstract). In ACT trials, the two choice
options were presented to the left and right of fixation, and thus in a
horizontal or action space configuration inwhich the side of presentation
directly related to the hand with which to choose that option. In ABS
trials, choice options were shown above and below fixation, and thus in a
vertical or goods space arrangement that did not reveal the required
action. In both conditions, stimuli were presented close to the center of
the screen and participants did not need to move their eyes to inspect
them. To maximally distinguish the hemodynamic response from the
offer and response phase, the duration of the offer phase varied between
4 and 11 s (Poisson distributed; mean 6 s).
The response phase started when the fixation cross turned red. In ACT
trials, the arrangement of the two choice options remained the same; in
ABS trials, the two options at the top and bottomwere switched to the left
and right of fixation (with a 50/50% chance), thus revealing the required
action mapping. Choices were indicated by a brief squeeze of a grip
device (see below for details) on the corresponding side (maximum re-
sponse time: 3 s; required force level: 35% of maximum voluntary con-
traction [MVC]). ACT and ABS trials were merged for all analyses
because no significant differenceswere found for the tests reported in this
manuscript.
On 70% of trials, no effort was required: as soon as participants indi-
cated their choice, the unchosen option disappeared, and the message
“no force” was displayed for 500 ms. The next trial commenced after a
variable delay (intertrial interval: 2–13 s; Poisson distributed; mean: 5 s).
On the remaining 30%of trials, a power grip of 12 s was required (effort).
Again, the unchosen option disappeared, but now a thermometer ap-
peared centrally and displayed the target force level of the chosen option.
Participants were given online visual feedback about the applied force
level using changing fluid levels in the thermometer. On successful ap-
plication of the required force for at least 80% of the 12 s period, a green
tick appeared (500ms; outcome phase; delay preceding outcome: 0.5–1.5
s uniform) and the rewardmagnitude of the chosen option was added to
the total winnings. Otherwise, the total winnings remained unchanged
(red cross: 500ms). Because participantswere almost always successful in
applying the required force on effort trials (accuracy: 99.30  0.004%;
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only 4 participants made any mistakes), there was no confound between
effort level and risk/reward expectation.
The sensitivity of the grip device wasmanipulated between trials (high
or low). A high gain meant that the grippers were twice as sensitive as for
a low gain, and thus the same force deviation doubled the rate of change
in the thermometer’s fluid level.While thismanipulationwas introduced
to study interactions between mental and physical effort, none of our
behavioral or fMRI analyses revealed any significant effects of gain dur-
ing the choice phase, which is the focus of the present paper.
To summarize, our task involved several important features: (1) as our
aim was to specifically examine value comparison mechanisms during
effort-based choice, we manipulated both options’ values and thus the
expected values of the two offers had to be computed and compared
online in each trial, unlike in previous experiments (Croxson et al., 2009;
Kurniawan et al., 2010, 2013; Pre´vost et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2013;
Bonnelle et al., 2016); (2) the decision process and the resulting motor
response were separated in time (see Fig. 1A). This enabled us to examine
the value comparison in the absence of, and not confounded with, pro-
Figure1. Task and behavior.A, Humanparticipants chose between two options associatedwith varying rewardmagnitude (numbers) and physical effort (bar height translates into force, Offer).
Once the fixation cross turned red (Response), participants were allowed to indicate their choice. Thus, the time of choice computation was separable in time from themotor response. Following a
response, the effort had to be realized on an unpredictable 30%of trials (top). On these trials, participants had to produce a 12 s power grip at a strength proportional to the bar height of the chosen
option. Force levels were adjusted to individuals’ maximum force at the start of the experiment. Participants received feedback about successful performance of the grip (99% accuracy), and the
rewards collected on successful trials were added to the total winnings. On 70% of trials (bottom), no effort was required and the next trial commenced (intertrial interval [ITI]). B, Participants’
choiceswere driven by both options’ rewardmagnitude and effort level showing that all dimensions of the outcomewere taken into account for computing a choice. Benefits and costs had opposite
effects: larger efforts discouraged, and larger rewardmagnitudes encouraged, the choice of an option (standard errors: SEM). C, Correlations between left (L), right (R), chosen (C), and unchosen
(U) effort levels (e) and reward magnitudes (r) show that the regressors of interest were sufficiently decorrelated in our design. D, Effort has a strong effect on choice in trials with small reward
differences, but no effect when the reward difference is large (green panels; median split on reward difference; effort binned for visualization). Similarly, reward has a stronger effect in trials with
small effort differences comparedwith trials with large effort differences (blue panels). This shows that participants indeed trade off effort against reward, and confirms that reward has a stronger
and opposite effect compared with effort (red slope), as shown in B. Black lines indicate individual participants and suggest that reward and effort were treated as continuous variables.
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cesses related to action execution; (3) both reward and effort levels were
varied parametrically rather than in discrete steps, and orthogonally to
each other, thereby granting high sensitivity for the identification of
effort and reward signals, respectively; (4) efforts were only realized on a
subset of trials, ensuring that decisions were not influenced by fatigue
(Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2015). Importantly, however, at the time of choice,
participants did not know whether a given trial was real or hypothetical;
therefore, the optimal strategy was to treat each trial as potentially real;
and (5) the duration of the grip on effort trials (12 s) had been deter-
mined in pilot experiments and ensured that force levels were factored
into the choice process. Moreover, the fixed duration of grip force also
meant that effort costs were not confounded with temporal costs.
Scanning procedure.Before scanning, force levels were adjusted to each
individual’s grip strength using a grip calibration. Participants were
seated in front of a computer monitor and held a custom-made grip
device in both hands. Each participant’s baseline (no grip) and MVC
were measured over a period of 3 s, separately for both hands. The mea-
sured values were used to define individual force ranges (0%–100%) for
each hand,whichwere thenused in the behavioral task, both prescanning
and during scanning.
Before entering the scanner, participants completed a training session
consistingofoneblockof thebehavioral task (112 trials,30min).This gave
them the opportunity to experience different force levels and to become
familiar with the task. Importantly, it also ensured that decisionsmade sub-
sequently in the scanner would not be influenced by uncertainty about the
difficulty of the displayed force levels. In the scanner, participants completed
two blocks of the task (overall task duration60min; 224 choices).
Generation of choice stimuli. Because our main question related to the
encoding of value difference signals during effort-based choices, the gen-
eration of suitable choice stimuli was a key part of the experimental
design. Choice options were identical for every individual and were cho-
sen such that they would minimize the correlation between the fMRI
regressors for chosen and unchosen effort, reward magnitude, and value
(obtained mean correlations after scanning: effort:0.23; reward mag-
nitude: 0.11; value: 0.43; see Fig. 1C). We also ensured that left and right
efforts, reward magnitudes, and values were decorrelated to be able to
identify action value signals (effort: 0.28; reward magnitude: 0.05; value:
0.07). We simulated several individuals using a previously suggested
value function for effort-based choice (Pre´vost et al., 2010). Stimuli were
optimized with the following additional constraints: either the efforts or
the rewardmagnitudes had to differ by at least 0.1 on each trial, the range
of efforts and rewardmagnitudeswas [0.2 to 0.8]MVCor 0–50 points,
respectively, and the overall expected value for both hands was compa-
rable. Furthermore, in 85%of trials, the larger rewardwas pairedwith the
larger effort level, and the smaller reward with the smaller effort level,
making the choice hard, but on 15% of trials, the larger reward was
associated with the smaller effort level (“no-brainer”). The two choice
sets that minimized the correlations between our regressors of interest
were used for the fMRI experiment. A third stimulus set was saved for the
behavioral training before scanning.
Preliminary fMRI analyses revealed that we had overlooked a bias in
our stimuli. In the last third of trials of the second block, the overall
offer value ((magnitude1/effort1  magnitude2/effort 2)/2) decreased
steadily, leading to skewed contrast estimates. Therefore, the last 40 trials
were discarded from all analyses.
We refer to choices in this study as “effort-based” to highlight the
distinction from purely outcome/reward-based choices or choices in-
volving other types of costs (e.g., delay-based). But of course, in our task,
all choices were effort- as well as reward-based.
Recordings of grip strength. The grippers were custom-made and con-
sisted of two force transducers (FSG15N1A, Honeywell) placed between
two molded plastic bars (see also Ward and Frackowiak, 2003). A con-
tinuous recording of the differential voltage signal, proportional to the
exerted force, was acquired, fed into a signal conditioner (CED 1902,
Cambridge Electronic Design), digitized (CED 1401, Cambridge Elec-
tronic Design), and fed into the computer running the stimulus presen-
tation. This enabled us, during effort trials, to give online feedback about
the exerted force using the thermometer display.
Behavioral analysis. To examine which task variables affected partici-
pants’ choice behavior, a logistic regression was fitted to participants’
choices (1 RH; 0 LH) using the following nine regressors: a RH-LH
bias (constant term); condition (ABS or ACT); gain (high or low); LH-
effort on previous trial; RH-effort on previous trial; reward magnitude
left; reward magnitude right; effort left; effort right. t tests performed
across participants on the obtained regression coefficients were adjusted
for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction. Because only re-
ward magnitudes and efforts influenced behavior significantly (see Re-
sults), the logistic regression models performed for the analysis of the
neural data below (Eqs. 2, 3) only contained these variables (or their
amalgamation into combined value).
To examine the influence of reward and effort on participants’ choice
behavior in more depth, we tested whether participants indeed weighed
up effort against reward, and whether they treated reward and effort as
continuous variables. If reward and effort compete for their influence on
choice, then the influence of effort should become larger as the reward
difference becomes smaller, and vice versa. Thus, we performed amedian
split of our trials according to the absolute difference in reward (or effort)
between the two choice options. We then calculated the likelihood of
choosing an option as a function of its effort (reward) level, separately for
the two sets of trials. Effort (reward) values were distributed across 10
bins with equal spacing; this binning was independent of the effort (re-
ward) level of the alternative option. For statistical comparisons, we fit-
ted a slope for each participant to the mean of all bins. t tests were
performed on the resulting four slopes testing for the influence of (1)
effort in trials with small reward difference, (2) effort in trials with large
reward difference, (3) reward in trials with small effort difference, and (4)
reward in trials with large effort difference. We report uncorrected p
values, but all conclusions hold when correcting for six comparisons
(1–4 against zero; 1 vs 2; 3 vs 4).
We also tested for effects of fatigue: the above logistic regression sug-
gested that choices were not affected by whether or not the previous trial
required the production of effort, as shown previously in this task (Klein-
Flu¨gge et al., 2015). More detailed analyses examined the percentage of
trials in which the higher effort option was chosen (running average
across 20 trials), and participants’ performance in reaching and main-
taining the required force. The latter was measured as the time point
when 10 consecutive samples were above force criterion (the shorter, the
sooner), and as the percentage of time out of 12 s that participants were at
criterion, respectively. For all measures, we compared the first and last
third of trials. Here we report the comparison between the first and last
third across the entire experiment. However, separate analyses, using the
first and last third of just the first or the second block, revealed identical
results. There were no effects of fatigue: in all cases, participants either
improved or stayed unchanged (percentage higher effort chosen: first
third, 60.56 1.94%; last third, 60.93 2.79%, p 0.69, t(20)0.40;
reaching the force threshold: first third, 0.83 0.04 s; last third, 0.76
0.03 s; p 0.01, t(20) 2.82; maintaining the force above threshold: first
third, 92.49 0.47%; last third, 93.51 0.28%; p 0.01, t(20)2.84).
To derive participants’ subjective values for the offers presented on
each trial, we developed an effort discountingmodel (Klein-Flu¨gge et al.,
2015). This model has been shown to provide better fits than the hyper-
bolic model previously suggested for effort discounting (Pre´vost et al.,
2010) both here and in our previously published work (Klein-Flu¨gge et
al., 2015). Crucially, its shape is initially concave, unlike a hyperbolic
function, allowing for smaller devaluations of value for effort increases at
weak force levels, and steeper devaluations at higher force levels, which is
intuitive for effort discounting and biologically plausible. Our model
follows the following form:
V  M1   11  ek	Cp
  11  ekp1  1ekp (1)
V is subjective value, C is the effort cost,M the reward magnitude, and k
and p are free parameters. C and M are scaled between 0 and 1, corre-
sponding to 0% MVC and 100% MVC, and 0 points and 50 points,
respectively. A simple logistic regression on the difference in subjective
values between choice options was then used to fit participants’ choices;
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in other words, the following function (softmax rule) was used to trans-
form the subjective values V1 and V2 of the two options offered on each
trial into the probability of choosing option 1 as follows:
P	choice1
 
1
1  eV	V1V2

(2)
The free parameters (slope k, turning point p, softmax precision param-
eter V), were fitted using the Variational Laplace algorithm (Penny et
al., 2003; Friston et al., 2007). This is a Bayesian estimation method,
which incorporates Gaussian priors over model parameters and uses a
Gaussian approximation to the posterior density. The parameters of the
posterior are iteratively updated using an adaptive step size, gradient
ascent approach. Importantly, the algorithm also provides the free en-
ergy F, which is an approximation to the model evidence. The model
evidence is the probability of obtaining the observed choice data, given
the model. To maximize our chances to find global, rather than local
maxima with this gradient ascent algorithm, parameter estimation was
repeated over a grid of initialization values, with eight initializations per
parameter. The optimal set of parameters (i.e., that obtained from the
initialization that resulted in themaximal free energy) was used formod-
eling subjective values in the fMRI data. For our BOLDanalyses, themost
relevant parameter was V. It reflects the weight (i.e., strength) with
which participants’ choices are driven by subjective value, rather than
noise; it is also often referred to as precision or inverse softmax temper-
ature. Fitting ACT andABS, or high and low gain trials separately did not
lead to any significant differences between conditions (paired t tests on
parameter estimates between conditions all p 0.3) and did not improve
the model evidence (paired t test on the model evidence; fitting condi-
tions separately or not: p 0.82; fitting gain separately or not: p 0.63).
Trials were therefore pooled for model fitting. Once fitted, the perfor-
mance of our new model was compared with that of the hyperbolic
model and two parameter-freemodels (difference: reward effort; quo-
tient: reward/effort) as described by Klein-Flu¨gge et al. (2015) using a
formal model comparison.
fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing. The fMRI methods followed
standard procedures (e.g., Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2013): T2*-weighted EPI
with BOLD contrast were acquired using a 12 channel head coil on a 3
tesla Trio MRI scanner (Siemens). A special sequence was used to mini-
mize signal drop out in the OFC region (Weiskopf et al., 2006) and
included a TE of 30 ms, a tilt of 30° relative to the rostrocaudal axis and a
local z-shim with a moment of 0.4 mT/m ms applied to the OFC
region. To achieve whole-brain coverage, we used 45 transverse slices of
2mm thickness, with an interslice gap of 1mmand in-plane resolution of
3 3 mm, and collected slices in an ascending order. This led to a TR of
3.15 s. In each session, a maximum of 630 volumes were collected (33
min) and the first five volumes of each block were discarded to allow for
T1 equilibration effects. A single T1-weighted structural image with 1
mm3 voxel resolutionwas acquired and coregisteredwith the EPI images
to permit anatomical localization. A fieldmap with dual echo-time im-
ages (TE1 10ms, TE2 14.76ms, whole brain coverage, voxel size 3
3  3 mm) was obtained for each subject to allow for corrections in
geometric distortions induced in the EPIs at high field strength (Ander-
sson et al., 2001).
During the EPI acquisition, we also obtained several physiological
measures. The cardiac pulse was recorded using an MRI-compatible
pulse oximeter (model 8600 F0, Nonin Medical), and thoracic move-
ment was monitored using a custom-made pneumatic belt positioned
around the abdomen. The pneumatic pressure changes were converted
into an analog voltage using a pressure transducer (Honeywell Interna-
tional) before digitization, as reported previously (Hutton et al., 2011).
Preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using SPM8
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm). Image preprocessing consisted of realignment of images to the
first volume, distortion correction using fieldmaps, slice time correction,
conservative independent component analysis to identify and remove
obvious artifacts (using MELODIC in Fmrib’s Software Library; http://
fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/), coregistration with the structural scan, normaliza-
tion to a standardMNI template, and smoothing using an 8mmFWHM
Gaussian kernel.
Data analysis: GLM. The first GLM (GLM1) included 12 main event
regressors. The offer phase was described using onsets for (1) ACT trials
preparing a left response, (2) ACT trials preparing a right response, and
(3) ABS trials. All three events were modeled using durations of 2 s and
were each associated with four parametric modulators: the reward mag-
nitude and effort of the chosen and unchosen option. Crucially, these
four parametricmodulators competed to explain common variance dur-
ing the estimation, rather than being serially orthogonalized (in other
words, we implicitly tested for effects that were unique to each paramet-
ric explanatory variable). The response phase was described using four
regressors for “no force” trials (1 s duration) and four regressors for
effort production trials (12 s duration): (4–7) no force ACTleft, ACTright,
ABSleft, ABSright; (8–11) effort production left (low gain), left (high gain),
right (low gain), right (high gain). Finally, the outcome wasmodeled as a
single regressor because the proportion of trials in which efforts were not
produced successfullywas negligible (median: 0;mean: 0.43 0.22 trials;
only 4 of 21 participants had any unsuccessful trials).
In addition to event regressors, a total of 23 nuisance regressors were
included to control for motion and physiological effects of no interest.
First, to account for motion-related artifacts that had not been elimi-
nated in rigid-body motion correction, the six motion regressors ob-
tained during realignment were included. Second, to remove variance
accounted for by cardiac and respiratory responses, a physiological noise
model was constructed using an in-houseMATLAB toolbox (TheMath-
Works) (Hutton et al., 2011). Models for cardiac and respiratory phase
and their aliased harmonics were based on RETROICOR (Glover et al.,
2000). Themodel for changes in respiratory volumewas based on Birn et
al. (2006). This resulted in 17 physiological regressors in total: 10 for
cardiac phase, 6 for respiratory phase, and 1 for respiratory volume.
The parameters of the hemodynamic response functionweremodified to
obtainadouble-gammahemodynamic response function,with the standard
settings in Fmrib’s Software Library (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/): delay to re-
sponse 6 s, delay to undershoot 16 s, dispersion of response 2.5 s, dispersion
of undershoot 4 s, ratio of response to undershoot 6 s, length of kernel 32 s.
The secondGLM(GLM2)was identical to the first, except that the four
parametric regressors (reward magnitude and effort of the chosen and
unchosen option) were replaced by the subjective model-derived values
of the chosen and unchosen option. This allowed us to identify regions
encoding the difference in subjective value between the offers.
Three further GLMs were fitted to the data to test whether the values
derived from the sigmoidal model provide the best explanation of the
measured BOLD signals. These GLMs were identical to GLM2, except
that the parametric regressors for the values of the chosen and unchosen
option derived from the sigmoidal model were replaced by (1) the values
derived from a hyperbolic model (GLM3), (2) the values derived from a
parameter-free difference “reward  effort” (GLM4), or (3) the values
derived from a parameter-free quotient “reward/effort” (GLM5).
Identifying signatures of choice computation.Our first aim was to iden-
tify brain regions with BOLD signatures of choice computation (see Fig.
2A). Thus, we first identified brain regions that fulfilled the following two
criteria (GLM1): (1) the BOLD signal correlated negatively with the dif-
ference in effort between chosen and unchosen options; and (2) the
BOLD signal correlated positively with the difference in reward magni-
tude between chosen and unchosen options. Collectively, these two sig-
nals form the basis of a value difference signal because effort contributes
negatively and reward magnitude contributes positively to overall value.
Previous work has demonstrated, using predictions derived from a bio-
physical cortical attractor network, that at the level of large neural pop-
ulations, as measured using human neuroimaging techniques, such as
fMRI or MEG, the characteristic signature of a choice comparison pro-
cess is a value difference signal (Hunt et al., 2012). The responses pre-
dicted for harder and easier choices differ because the speed of the
network computations varies as a function of choice difficulty (e.g., faster
for high value difference). Thus, an area at the formal conjunction of the
two contrasts described by options 1 and 2 would carry the relevant
signatures for computing a subjective value difference signal, a cardinal
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requirement for guiding choice. Importantly, while we reasoned that the
choice computations in our specific task should follow similar principles
as in Hunt et al. (2012), we expected this computation to occur in differ-
ent regions because it would be based on the integration of a different
type of decision cost. In an additional analysis (see Fig. 5), for complete-
ness, we also identified brain regions significant in the inverse contrast
(i.e., a conjunction of positive effort and negative reward magnitude
difference) (Wunderlich et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011).
Regions of interest (ROIs) and extraction of time courses. For whole-
brain analyses, we used a FWE cluster-corrected threshold of p  0.05
(using a cluster-defining threshold of p 0.01 and a cluster threshold of
10 voxels). For a priori ROI analyses, we used a small-volume corrected
FWE cluster-level threshold of p  0.05 in spheres of 5 mm around
previous coordinates, namely, in left and right putamen ([26,8,2])
(Croxson et al., 2009), SMA ([4, 6, 58]) (Croxson et al., 2009), and
vmPFC ([6, 48,8] (Boorman et al., 2009).
BOLD time series were extracted from the preprocessed data of the
identified regions by averaging the time series of all voxels that were
significant at p 0.001 (uncorrected). Time series were up-sampledwith
a resolution of 315 ms (1/10  TR) and split into trials for visual illus-
tration of the described effects (e.g., see Fig. 2B).
At the suggestion of one reviewer, the twomain analyses (conjunction
of reward and inverse effort difference described above, and value differ-
ence contrast described below) were repeated in FSL using Flame1 be-
cause of differences between SPM and FSL in controlling for false
positives when using cluster-level corrections (Eklund et al., 2015). For
this control analysis, we imported the preprocessed (unsmoothed) im-
ages to FSL.We then used FSL’s default smoothing kernel of 5 mm and a
cluster-forming threshold of z 2.3 (corresponding to p 0.01; default
in FSL). The obtained results are overlaid in Figure 2A, D.
Encoding of subjective value. We next asked whether BOLD signal
changes in the regions identified using the abovementioned conjunction
could indeed be described by the subjective values derived from our
custom-made behavioral model. We thus performed a whole-brain con-
trast, identifying regions encoding the difference in subjective value be-
tween the chosen and unchosen option (GLM2; see Fig. 2D). To test
whether the BOLD signal was better explained by subjective value
as modeled using the sigmoidal function or three alternative models
(hyperbolic; “difference”: reward  effort; “quotient”: reward/effort;
GLM3-GLM5; see Fig. 3B), we calculated the difference between the
value difference maps obtained on the first level for each participant
(sigmoid vs hyperbolic; sigmoid vs difference; sigmoid vs quotient;
see Fig. 3C). A standard second-level t test was performed on the three
resulting difference images and statistical significance evaluated as
usual.
Relating neural and behavioral effects of value difference. If it was indeed
the case that the regions identified to encode value difference are in-
volved in choice computation and as a result, informbehavior, the BOLD
value signal should systematically relate to behavioral measures of choice
performance (Jocham et al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2012). To test this, we
used the behavioral measure of the effect of value difference, V, as de-
rived from the logistic regression analysis above (Eq. 2). Importantly,
before fitting V, model-derived subjective values were scaled between
[0, 1] for all participants so that any difference in the fitted regression
coefficient V indicated how strongly value difference influenced behav-
ioral choices in a given participant. V reflects how consistently partici-
pants choose the subjectively more valuable option. In other words, this
parameter captures how strongly value rather than noise determines
choice behavior. To examine whether the size of the neural value differ-
ence signal carried behavioral relevance, the behavioral weights V were
then used as a covariate for the value difference contrast in a second-level
group analysis. At the whole-brain level, we thus identified regions where
the encoding of value difference was significantly modulated by how
strongly participants’ choices were driven by subjective value (see Fig.
2F ). This analysis was restricted to the regions that encoded value differ-
ence at the first level. For illustration of the effect, the neural signature of
value difference (regression coefficients for chosen vs unchosen value at
the peak time of 6 s) was plotted against V (see Fig. 2F ).
Reward maximization versus effort minimization. In our task, reward
maximization is in conflict with effort minimization in almost all trials
because the option that has a higher reward value is also associated with
a higher effort level. To capture the separate behavioral influences of
reward and effort for each participant, another logistic regression analy-
sis was conducted, but now both the difference in offer magnitudes and
in efforts were entered into the design matrix, rather than just their
combination into value as in Equation 2 as follows:
P	choice1
 
1
1  eM	M1M2
E	E1E2

(3)
Here, M is the weight or precision with which rewardmagnitude differ-
ence (M1M2) influences choice, and E is the weight (precision) with
which effort difference (E1 E2) influences choice.
Next, to identify which brain regions might bias the choice computation
either toward reward or away from physical effort, we performed two inde-
pendent tests. First,weused thebehaviorally definedweights for effort,E,
as a covariate on the second level, to identify regions where the encoding of
effort difference scales with how “effort averse” participants were. In such
regions, a larger difference between chosen and unchosen effort signals
would indicate that participants avoid efforts more strongly (see Fig. 4B).
Based on prior work, we had a priori hypotheses about effort preferences
being guided by SMAandputamen (e.g., Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et
al., 2010, 2013; Burke et al., 2013). Therefore, we used a small-volume cor-
rection (p  0.05) around previously established coordinates (putamen
[26, 8, 2]; SMA [4, 6, 58]) (Croxson et al., 2009). Second, in an
analogous fashion, we used the behavioral weights for reward magnitude,
M, as a covariate on the second level to identify regionswhere the encoding
of rewardmagnitude difference scaleswith how reward-seeking participants
are. Inbrain regions thus identified, a largerBOLDsignal differencebetween
chosen and unchosen reward signals would imply that participants place a
strongerweighton rewardmaximization in their choices (seeFig. 4A). Based
on prior work, we expected reward magnitude comparisons to occur in
vmPFC(e.g., Kable andGlimcher, 2007; Boormanet al., 2009; Philiastides et
al., 2010). Therefore, we used a small-volume correction (p 0.05) around
previously established coordinates [6, 48,8] (Boorman et al., 2009).
We further characterized the relationship between participants’ effort
sensitivity and BOLD signal changes by askingwhether the neural encod-
ing of effort difference relates to the individual distortions captured in
the parameters k and p of the effort discounting function. For each trial,
we compared the true effort difference between the chosen and unchosen
option with the modeled subjective effort difference between the chosen
and unchosen option. We took the sum of the absolute error from the
best linear fit between these two variables as an index of how well our
initial GLM captured subjective distortions in the evaluation of effort.
We used this measure as an additional regressor for our second-level
analysis, in addition to E (these two regressors are uncorrelated: r 
0.27, p  0.24). This approach had the advantage that it combined
subjective effort distortions driven by both p and k into a single param-
eter relevant for the effort comparison (correlation of the summed errors
with k: r 0.9646, p 0.001; with p: r 0.60, p 0.0043).
Results
Human participants performed choices between options with
varying rewards and physical efforts (force grips; Fig. 1A). Our
main aimwas to identify areas carrying neural signatures of value
comparison, which are sometimes absent on choices when all
decision variables favor the same choice (Hunt et al., 2012).
Therefore, for the majority of decisions, larger rewards were
paired with larger efforts so that reward maximization competed
with energy minimization, and the reward and effort of each
option had to be combined into an integrated subjective value to
derive a choice. We first tested whether both the size of reward
and the associated effort of each choice option had an impact on
participant’s choice behavior. A logistic regression showed that
participants’ choices were indeed guided by the reward magni-
tude and effort of both options (left reward: t(20)  9.71, Co-
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hen’s d4.34, p 4.28e-08; right reward: t(20) 8.89, Cohen’s
d 3.98, p 1.44e-07; left effort: t(20) 7.56, Cohen’s d 3.38,
p 2.79e-06; right effort: t(20)8.37, Cohen’s d3.74, p
2.79e-06; Fig. 1B). As expected, larger rewards and smaller effort
costs attracted choices. Overall, participants chose the higher ef-
fort option on 48 2% of trials.
Next, we examined whether effort was weighed up against
reward; if this was the case, the influence of effort (reward) on the
participant’s choicewould become stronger as the reward (effort)
difference between the options becomes smaller. Indeed, effort
had a bigger impact on choice in trials with a small compared
with a large reward difference (median split; Fig. 1D, green pan-
els; difference in slopes: t(20)  18.06, p  7.51e-14; small re-
ward difference only: slope1.23 0.11; t(20)11.51, p
2.82e-10; large reward difference only: slope  0.26  0.12,
t(20)  1.95, p  0.066). The same was true for reward: its
impact on choice behavior was greater in trials with a small com-
pared with a large effort difference (Fig. 1D, blue panels; differ-
ence in slopes: t(20) 11.95, p 1.46e-10; small effort difference
only: slope 1.65 0.05, t(20) 36.03, p 1.14e-19; large effort
difference only: slope  0.38  0.12, t(20)  3.08, p  0.0059).
This analysis also confirmed that effort and reward were treated
as continuous variables.
Given that behavior was guided by the costs as well as the
benefits associated with the two choice options, we next asked
whether any brain region encoded both effort and reward in a
reference frame consistent with choice. Our main aim was to
identify neural signatures of the choice computation: any brain
region comparing the values of the two choice options should be
sensitive to information about both costs and benefits. Recent
work using a biophysically realistic attractor network model
(Wang, 2002) suggests that the mass activity of a region comput-
ing a choice should reflect the difference of the values of both
choice options (Hunt et al., 2012). In our task, a region compar-
ing the options should hence encode (1) the inverse difference
between chosen and unchosen efforts and (2) the (positive) dif-
ference between chosen and unchosen rewards. We therefore
computed the formal conjunction of these two contrasts, which is
a conservative test, asking whether any region is significant in
both comparisons. This test focused on the decision phase, which
was separated in time from the motor response (Fig. 1A). We
identified a cluster of activation in the SMA and in the caudal
portion of dorsal ACC (dACC), on the border of the anterior and
posterior rostral cingulate zones (RCZa, RCZp) and area 24
(Neubert et al., 2015) (Fig. 2A; p  0.05 cluster-level FWE-cor-
rected; peak coordinate: [6, 11, 34], t(1,40)  4.02; SMA peak
coordinate: [9, 7, 58], t(1,40)  5.29). No other regions
reached FWE cluster-corrected significance (p 0.05). Notably,
we did not identify any activations in the vmPFC, a region com-
monly identified in reward-related value computations, even at
lenient statistical thresholds (p 0.01, uncorrected). Replication
of this conjunction analysis in FSL, performed at the suggestion
of one reviewer, obtained comparable results, with only dACC
and SMA reaching cluster-level corrected significance (Fig. 2A,
green overlays). The two difference signals for effort and reward
are illustrated for the BOLD time series extracted from the dACC
cluster in Figure 2B.
These results raise the question of whether and how effort and
reward are combined into an integrated value for each option, a
prerequisite for testing whether any brain region encodes the
comparison between subjective option values. Although estab-
lished models exist to examine how participants compute com-
pound values for uncertain/risky rewards (prospect theory)
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
and delayed rewards (hyperbolic) (Mazur, 1987; Laibson, 1997;
Frederick et al., 2002), it remains unclear how efforts and rewards
are combined into a subjective measure of value. We performed
several behavioral experiments to develop a behavioral model
that can formally describe the range of effort discounting behav-
iors observed in healthy populations (Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2015).
One key feature of this model is that it can accommodate cases
when increases in effort at lower effort levels have a compara-
tively small effect on value, compared with increases in effort at
higher effort levels (i.e., concave discounting).
When we fitted this model to the choices recorded during the
scanning session, participants’ behaviorwas indeedbest capturedby
an initially concave discounting shape (initially concave in 16 of 21
participants; Fig. 2C), consistent with previous work (Klein-Flu¨gge
et al., 2015) and the intuition that effort increases are less noticeable
at lower levels of effort compared with higher levels of effort.
Using the individual model fits, we then directly tested for
neural signatures consistentwith a value comparison between the
subjective values of the two choice options. This is a slightly less
conservative test than the formal conjunction of effort and re-
wardmagnitude difference described above, but we note that this
test revealed a highly consistent pattern of results. We found
strong evidence for a network consisting of the SMA (peak: [9,
7, 58], t(1,20) 8.64), caudal portion of dACC (peak: [3, 11,
34], t(1,20) 7.1), and bilateral putamen (several peaks: left [33,
13, 4], t(1,20)  4.96 and [33, 10, 2], t(1,20)  5.28; right
[33,1,2], t(1,20) 4.96) to encode the (positive) difference in
subjective value between the chosen and unchosen options (Fig.
2D; all cluster-level FWE-corrected; p 0.05). Again, compara-
ble results were obtained using FSL (Fig. 2D, green overlays). This
network resembled regions previously described for the evalua-
tion of physical effort but was clearly distinct from the neural
system associated with decisions about goods involving the
vmPFC (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Boorman et al., 2009;
FitzGerald et al., 2009; Philiastides et al., 2010; Hunt et al., 2012;
Kolling et al., 2012; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Strait et al., 2014).
To validate our choice of behavioral discounting model, we
performed a formal model comparison and found that the
sigmoidal model provided a better explanation of choice be-
havior than (convex) hyperbolic discounting, previously pro-
posed for effort discounting (Pre´vost et al., 2010), and two
parameter-free descriptions of value “reward minus effort”
and “reward divided by effort” (model exceedance probabil-
ity: xp  1; mean of posterior distribution: mp_sigm  0.75;
mp_hyp 0.05; mp_diff 0.16; mp_div 0.04; Fig. 3A). On
average, the sigmoidal model correctly predicted 88  1% of
choices. To examine whether our measure of value derived
from the sigmoidal model also best predicted the BOLD signal,
we recalculated the value difference contrasts in an analogous
way, this time modeling value using a hyperbolic or one of the
two parameter-free models. The resulting whole-brain maps
similarly highlighted SMA and dACC (surviving cluster-level
FWE-corrected, p  0.05 for the hyperbolic and difference
models, not significant for the quotient model; Fig. 3B). But
importantly, direct statistical comparison showed that the
neural signal in these regions was significantly better ex-
plained by the values derived from the sigmoidal model
(cluster-level FWE-corrected, p  0.05 for the difference
and quotient models; sigmoidal vs hyperbolic: SMA peak [3,
7, 61], t(1,19)  3.95; sigmoidal vs difference: dACC peak
[6, 11, 34], t(1,19)  3.28; SMA peak [6, 7, 58], t(1,19) 
5.33; sigmoidal vs quotient: dACC peak [6, 11, 34], t(1,19)
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Figure 2. Neural signatures of effort choice comparison in SMA and dACC. A, As a marker of choice computation, we identified regions encoding (1) the difference between the chosen
and unchosen reward magnitudes and (2) the inverse difference between the chosen and unchosen effort levels. The conjunction of both contrasts in SPM (shown at p  0.001
uncorrected) revealed the SMA and a region in the caudal portion of dACC (both FWE-corrected p 0.05). Cluster-level corrected results obtained from FSL’s Flame 1 (z 2.3, p 0.05)
are overlaid in green to confirm this finding. B, For illustration purposes, the two opposing difference signals are shown for the dACC cluster on the right (standard errors: SEM). C, A
custom-built sigmoidal model was fitted to participants’ choices to obtain individual effort discounting curves (gray; red represents group mean). In the model, the subjective value of
an option’s reward ( y-axis, represented in %) is discounted with increasing effort levels (x-axis). This allowed inferring the subjective values ascribed to choice options and modeling of
subjective value in the BOLD data. D, The difference in subjective value between the chosen and unchosen option, as derived from the behavioral effort discounting model in C, was
encoded in a similar network of regions as the combined difference in reward magnitude and effort shown in A, including caudal dACC, SMA, bilateral putamen, and insula (shown at p
0.001 uncorrected as obtained with SPM; cluster-level corrected FSL results overlaid in green for z 2.7, p 0.05). E, The subjective value difference signal extracted from the dACC is
shown for illustration (standard errors: SEM). F, Left, Regions encoding subjective value as in D but where the strength of this signal additionally correlated with the extent to which
value difference guided behavior (inverse softmax temperatureV; shown at p 0.01 uncorrected; only the dACC survives cluster-level FWE-correction at p 0.05). Right, Illustration
of the correlation in dACC for visual display purposes only. The stronger the BOLD difference between the chosen and unchosen option in this region, the more precisely participants’
choices are guided by value (V). This suggests that the dACC’s value signal computed at the time of choice is relevant for guiding choices. G, Regions where the encoding of effort
difference correlates, across subjects, with a marker for the individual level of effort distortion as captured by the parameters k and p of the modeled discount function. The better an
individual’s subjectively experienced effort was captured in the GLM (i.e., the less distorted their discount function), the stronger the inverse effort difference signal in caudal dACC and
SMA (light blue represents p 0.001 uncorrected; dark blue represents p 0.005 uncorrected; dACC/SMA survive cluster-level FWE-correction at p 0.05). This suggests that dACC
and SMA encode effort difference in the way it subjectively influences the choice.
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4.77; SMA peak [6, 7, 61], t(1,19)  6.72; Fig. 3C). This
suggests that the BOLD signal aligns with the subjective expe-
rience of effort-discounted value, which was best captured
using the sigmoidal model.
A crucial question is whether the observed value difference
signal bears any behavioral relevance for choice, rather than po-
tentially being a mere byproduct of a choice computation else-
where. In the former case, one would expect that the encoding of
subjective value difference relates to the strength, or “weight,”
withwhich subjective value difference influenced behavior across
participants (Jocham et al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2012; Khamassi et
al., 2015). Such a behavioral weight was derived for each partici-
pant using a logistic regression on the normalizedmodel-derived
subjective values. The resulting parameter estimate is the same
as the inverse softmax temperature or precision and reflects
how consistently participants choose the subjectively more
valuable option (see V in Eq. 2). The only region that was
significant in this second-level test and also encoded value
difference at the first level was the dACC (Fig. 2F; cluster-level
FWE-corrected, p 0.05; peak [3, 11, 31], t(1,19) 3.71). In
other words, dACC encoded value difference on average
across the group, and participants who exhibited a larger
BOLD value difference signal in the dACC were also more
consistent in choosing the subjectively better option (larger
V); this relationship is illustrated in Figure 2F.
To further probe whether the identified network of regions
evaluates the choice options in a subjectivemanner, we examined
the relationship between the subjective “distortion” of effort de-
scribed by the parameters k and p of the individual effort discount
function, and the BOLD signal related to the effort difference
across participants. We calculated a measure to describe how
much the true effort difference deviated from the subjectively
experienced effort difference overall across trials. This “distor-
tion” regressor correlated with k (r  0.9646, p  0.001) and p
(r 0.60, p 0.0043), but notE (r0.27, p 0.24), and was
used as a second-level covariate for the effort difference contrast.
GLM1 contained the efforts shown on the screen and thus should
have captured the subjectively experienced effort better in partic-
ipants who showed smaller effort distortions (i.e., with discount-
ing closer to linear). Thus, in regions related to the comparison of
subjective effort or effort-integrated value, we expected parti-
cipants with less effort distortions to show a stronger negative
effort difference signal. Indeed, we found such a positive second-
level correlation with the BOLD signal in dACC and SMA, sup-
porting the notion that effort difference is encoded in these
regions in the way it subjectively influences the choice (Fig. 2G;
cluster-level FWE-corrected, p 0.05; dACC peak [3, 14, 31],
t(1,19)  5.01, global maxima; SMA peak [6, 7, 61], t(1,19) 
4.08).
ACC has access to information from motor structures (Se-
lemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985; Dum and Strick, 1991; More-
craft and Van Hoesen, 1992, 1998; Kunishio and Haber, 1994;
Beckmann et al., 2009) previously linked to evaluating effort
(Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010, 2013; Burke et al.,
Figure 3. Model-derived value describes choice signals more accurately thanmodel-free value. A, Bayesianmodel comparison for value modeled using the sigmoidal model, hyperbolic model,
and two parameter-free descriptions of value: rewardminus effort and reward divided by effort. The sigmoidalmodel captures choice behavior best (standard errors: SEM).B, Comparison of the
BOLD response to value difference for the behavioral sigmoidal model (red; like Fig. 2D), the hyperbolic model (purple), and the parameter-free descriptions of value (blue: reward effort; green:
reward/effort; all shown at p 0.001 uncorrected). The three alternative contrasts reveal a similar network, albeit less strongly. C, Crucially, the sigmoidal model provides a significantly better
description of the BOLD signal in SMA, extending into caudal dACC, comparedwith all othermodels. Purple represents sigmoidal versus hyperbolic. Blue represents sigmoidal versus parameter-free
subtraction. Green represents sigmoidal versus parameter-free division (shown at p 0.001 uncorrected).
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2013), and prefrontal regions known to be involved in reward
processing, such as the vmPFC and OFC (Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2006; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Levy and Glimcher,
2011; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011; Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2013;
Chau et al., 2015; Stalnaker et al., 2015). We thus reasoned that
the ACC may be a key node for the type of effort-based choice
assessed in the present task. To further test this hypothesis, we
sought to identify regions that mediate between reward maximi-
zation versus effort minimization in our task.
To this end, we first extracted two separate behavioral weights
reflecting participants’ tendency to seek reward and avoid effort.
These behavioral parameters were derived from a logistic regres-
sion with two regressors explaining how much choices were
guided by the difference in reward magnitude and the difference
in effort level between options (M and E in Eq. 3). This is
distinct fromusing just one regressor for the combined subjective
value difference as done above (V). Across participants, we then
first identified brain regions where the encoding of chosen versus
unchosen rewardmagnitude correlatedwith theweight,M,with
which choices were influenced by the difference in reward be-
tween the chosen and unchosen option. Second, we performed
the equivalent test for effort (i.e., we identified regions where the
neural encoding of chosen vs unchosen effort correlated with the
weight,E, with which behavior was guided by the difference in
effort between the chosen and unchosen option). The two tests
revealed two distinct networks of regions. First, the vmPFC en-
coded reward magnitude difference across subjects as a function
of how much participants’ choices were driven by the difference
in reward between the options (SVC FWE-corrected cluster-level
p  0.037; peak [6, 44, 8], t(1,19)  2.87; Fig. 4A). Unlike in
many other tasks (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Boorman et al.,
2009; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Philiastides et al., 2010; Hunt et al.,
2012; Kolling et al., 2012; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Strait
et al., 2014), the vmPFC BOLD signal did not correlate with
chosen reward or reward difference on average in the group.
However, reward difference signals were on average positive for
participants whose choices were more strongly driven by reward
magnitudes (median split; Fig. 4A). At the whole-brain level, the
correlation of behavioral reward-weight, M, and BOLD reward
difference encoding did not reveal any activations using our FWE
cluster-level corrected criterion of p  0.05. Using a lenient ex-
ploratory threshold (p  0.01, uncorrected), we identified a
small number of other regions including the posterior cingulate
cortex bilaterally and visual cortex (Fig. 4A), but crucially no
clusters in motor, supplementary motor, or striatal regions.
By contrast, a network of motor regions, including SMA and
putamen, encoded effort difference as a function of the individual
behavioral effort weight E (Fig. 4B; SVC FWE-corrected
cluster-level SMA: p 0.048, peak [3,7, 58], t(1,19) 2.59; left
putamen: p  0.035, peak [27, 4, 5], t(1,19)  3.39; right
putamen no suprathreshold voxels). In other words, these re-
gions encoded the difference in effort between the chosen and
unchosen options more strongly in participants whose choices
were negatively influenced by large effort differences (i.e., partici-
pants who were more sensitive to effort costs). Using a whole-brain
FWE cluster-level-corrected threshold (p 0.05), no regions were
detected in this contrast. At an exploratory threshold (p  0.01,
uncorrected), this contrast alsohighlighted regions in thebrainstem,
primarymotor cortex, thalamus, and dorsal striatum (Fig. 4B), and
thus regions previously implicated in evaluating motor costs and in
Figure 4. Distinct circuits bias choices toward rewardmaximization or effort minimization. A, Regionswhere the encoding of rewardmagnitude difference varied as a function of the behavioral
weight participants placed on reward (M; top: shownat p 0.01 uncorrected). This showed that the BOLD signal in vmPFC (SVC FWE-corrected, p 0.05) reflected the difference between chosen
and unchosen rewardmore strongly in participantswho also placed a strongerweight onmaximizing reward (top, bottom left). Althoughwe could not identify an average reward difference coding
in vmPFC across the group, the subset of participantswho placed a strongerweight on reward (largerM;median split, ellipse) did encode the difference between the chosen and unchosen reward
magnitudes (bottom right). This suggests that vmPFC might bias choices toward reward maximization (standard errors: SEM). B, A very distinct network of regions, including the SMA and
putamen (both SVC FWE-corrected, p 0.05), encoded effort difference as a function of participants’ behavioral effort weight (E; shown at p 0.01 uncorrected). This systemwas active more
strongly in participants who tried to more actively avoid higher efforts and has often been associated with effort evaluation. It might counteract the vmPFC circuit shown in A to achieve effort
minimization,which is in constant conflictwith rewardmaximization in our task. Correlation plots (bottom) are only shown for visual illustration of the effects for a priori ROIs; no statistical analyses
were performed on these data.
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recruiting resources in anticipation of effort (Croxson et al., 2009;
Burke et al., 2013; Kurniawan et al., 2013), but clearly distinct from
the vmPFC/posterior cingulate cortex network identified in the
equivalent test for reward above.
Together, our data thus show that two distinct networks cen-
tered on vmPFC versus SMA/putamen encode the reward versus
effort difference as a function of howmuch these variables influ-
ence the final choice. Yet only the caudal portion of dACC en-
codes the difference in overall subjective value as a function of
how much overall value influences choice. This region in dACC
could therefore be a potential mediator between rewardmaximi-
zation and effort minimization, which appear to occur in sepa-
rate neural circuits.
Functionally distinct subregions of medial PFC
For completeness, we also tested whether any areas encode an
opposite value difference signal (i.e., the inverse of the conjunc-
tion analysis and of the subjective value difference contrast per-
formed above), reflecting the evidence against the chosen option
and thus one notion of decision difficulty. This did not reveal any
regions at our conservative (cluster-level FWE-corrected) thresh-
old in either test. At a more lenient exploratory threshold (p 
0.01 uncorrected), a single common cluster in medial PFC (pre-
SMA/area 9) was identified (Fig. 5), in agreement with previous
reports of negative value difference signals in this region (Wun-
derlich et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011). Importantly, the location of
this activation was clearly distinct from the caudal dACC region
found to encode a positive value difference (Fig. 2). Here, by
contrast, value difference signals did not correlate with the
strengthwithwhich subjective value difference influenced behav-
ior across participants (V; no suprathreshold voxels at p 0.01
uncorrected), suggesting that this region’s functions during
choice are separate from those that bias behavior.
Discussion
Choices requiring the consideration of motor costs are ubiqui-
tous in everyday life. Unlike other types of choices, they require
knowledge of the current state of the body and its available energy
resources, to weight physical costs against potential benefits.
How this trade-off might be implemented neurally remains
largely unknown.
Here, we identified a region in the caudal part of dACC as the
key brain region that carried the requisite signatures for effort-
based choice: dACC represented the costs and benefits of the
chosen relative to the alternative option, integrated effort and
reward into a combined subjective value signal, computed the
subjective value difference between the chosen relative to the
alternative option, and activity here correlated with the degree to
which participants’ choices were driven by value.
ACC integrates effort and reward information
Work from several lines of research suggests that ACC may be a
key region for performing cost-benefit integration for effort-
based choice. For example, lesions to ACC (but not OFC) result
in fewer choices of a high effort/high reward comparedwith a low
effort/low reward option: yet such animals still choose larger re-
ward options when effort costs for both options are equated,
implying that ACC is not essential when decisions can be solved
only by reward (Walton et al., 2003, 2009; Schweimer and Hau-
ber, 2005; Rudebeck et al., 2006; Floresco and Ghods-Sharifi,
2007). BOLD responses in human ACC reflect the integrated
value of effort-based options in the absence of choice (Croxson et
al., 2009). Further, single neuron recordings from ACC encode
information about both effort and reward (Shidara and Rich-
mond, 2002; Kennerley et al., 2009, 2011) and integrate costs and
benefits into a value signal (Hillman and Bilkey, 2010; Hosokawa
et al., 2013; Hunt et al., 2015). ACC thus appears to have a critical
role in integrating effort and reward information to derive the
subjective value of performing a particular action.
ACC encodes a choice comparison signal
However, from the aforementioned work, it remained unclear
whether cost-benefit values of different choice options are actu-
ally compared in ACC, or whether reward and effort may be
compared in separate neural structures and the competition re-
solved between areas. When one choice option is kept constant,
the value of the changing option correlates perfectly with the
value difference between the options (Kurniawan et al., 2010;
Pre´vost et al., 2010; Bonnelle et al., 2016), which precludes dis-
tinguishing between valuation and value comparison processes.
This is similarly true when only one option is offered and
accepted/rejected (Bonnelle et al., 2016). We here varied both
options’ values from trial to trial, which allowed us to identify a
choice comparison signal in the ACC, and thus the essential neu-
ral signature implicating this area in decision making. First, we
Figure 5. Opposite coding of relative choice value in dorsal medial frontal cortex. A, Regions where the BOLD signal encodes an inverse rather than a positive difference between chosen and
unchosen reward magnitudes and a positive rather than an inverse difference between chosen and unchosen effort (i.e., the exact inverse of the conjunction shown in Fig. 2A). The only region
detected at a lenient threshold ( p 0.01 uncorrected; no regions survive FWE correction) is a nearby but anatomically distinct region in medial prefrontal cortex previously suggested to serve as
a choice comparator (Wunderlich et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011). B, However, in this region, the BOLD signal does not relate to behavior, as was the case for the caudal portion of dACC (see Fig. 2F ).
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show that a region in the caudal portion of dACC encodes sepa-
rate difference signals for effort and reward. The direction of
these difference signals alignswith their respective effect on value,
with effort decreasing and reward increasing an option’s overall
value. Second, we demonstrate a comparison signal between in-
tegrated option values.We used a novel behavioralmodel (Klein-
Flu¨gge et al., 2015) to characterize participants’ individual
tendency to discount reward given the level ofmotor costs. Using
the resultant model-derived subjective values, we identified the
dACC as a region encoding a combined value difference signal.
Indeed, our model provided a better characterization of the
BOLD signal than other models of effort discounting, and dACC
activity was related to individuals’ “distortions” of effort. This
resolves an important question showing that effort and reward
information are indeed brought together within a single region to
inform choice.
Finally, this value comparison signal also varied as a function
of how much value influenced choices across participants. This
result further strengthens the idea that the dACC plays a crucial
role in guiding choice, rather than merely representing effort or
reward information. In our task, no other region exhibited sim-
ilar dynamics, even at lenient thresholds.
Influences from “effort” and “reward” circuits
Nevertheless, an important question remains: do the regions that
preferentially encode reward or effort have any influence on
choice? To examine this question, we looked for regions that
explain participants’ tendency to avoid effort, or to seek reward.
This analysis revealed two distinct circuits. Whereas signals in
vmPFC reflected the relative benefits as a function of how
reward-driven participants’ choices were, a network more com-
monly linked to action selection and effort evaluation (Croxson
et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010, 2013; Pre´vost et al., 2010;
Burke et al., 2013; Bonnelle et al., 2016), including SMA and
putamen, encoded relative effort as a function of howmuch par-
ticipants tried to avoid energy expenditure. It will be of interest to
examine in future work how these circuits interact, and how
different modulatory systems contribute to this interplay (see
e.g., Varazzani et al., 2015). This question should be extended to
situations when different costs coincide or different strategies
compete (for one recent example, see Burke et al., 2013), or
when information about effort and reward has to be learned
(Skvortsova et al., 2014; Scholl et al., 2015).
Converging evidence for multiple decision circuits
Our results contribute to an emerging literature demonstrating the
existence ofmultiple decision systems in the brainwhich are flexibly
recruitedbasedon the typeofdecision (Rushworth et al., 2012).One
well-studied system concerns choices where costs are directly tied to
outcomes (e.g., risk, delay). During this type of choice, vmPFC en-
codes thedifferencebetweenthechosenandunchosenoptions’ cost-
benefit value (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Boorman et al., 2009;
Philiastides et al., 2010; Hunt et al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2012), con-
sistent with the decision impairments observed after vmPFC lesions
(Noonan et al., 2010;Camille et al., 2011a, c).Other types of choices,
however, rely on other networks (Kolling et al., 2012; Hunt et al.,
2014;Wan et al., 2015). In the present study, decisions required the
integration of motor costs, and we show that for this, dACC, rather
thanvmPFC,plays amore central role. vmPFCdidnot encodeover-
all value or the difference in value between the options in our task; in
our hands, vmPFC evidenced no information about effort costs,
consistent with previous proposals (Pre´vost et al., 2010; Skvortsova
et al., 2014).
Functionally dissociable anatomical subregions of mPFC
The location in the dACC identified here is distinct from a more
anterior and dorsal region in medial frontal cortex (in or near
pre-SMA) where BOLD encodes the opposite signal: a negative
value difference (Wunderlich et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011). It is
also more posterior than a dACC region involved in foraging
choices (Kolling et al., 2012). The cluster of activation identified
here extends from the cingulate gyrus dorsally into the lower
bank of the cingulate sulcus, and it is sometimes also referred to it
as midcingulate cortex (MCC) (Procyk et al., 2016) or rostral
cingulate zone (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). According to a recent
connectivity-based parcellation, our activation is on the border
of areas RCZa (34%), RCZp (33%) and area 24 (48%) (Neubert
et al., 2015).While it shares some voxels with themotor cingulate
regions in humans (Amiez and Petrides, 2014), most parts of our
cluster are more ventral and located in the gyral portion of ACC
(for a discussion of functionally dissociable activations in ACC,
see also Kolling et al., 2016).
Relevance for disorders of motivation
Our findings in the dACC speak to an important line of research
showing deficits in effort-based decision making in a number of
disorders, including depression, negative symptom schizophre-
nia, and apathy (Levy and Dubois, 2006; Cle´ry-Melin et al., 2011;
Treadway et al., 2012, 2015; Fervaha et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2013;
Hartmann et al., 2014; Pizzagalli, 2014; Yang et al., 2014; Bonnelle
et al., 2015). Patients with these disorders often show a reduced
ability to initiate effortful actions to obtain reward. Crucially,
they also exhibit abnormalities in ACC and basal ganglia circuits,
as well as other regions processing information about the auto-
nomic state, including the amygdala and some brainstem struc-
tures (Drevets et al., 1997; Botteron et al., 2002; Levy andDubois,
2006). Furthermore, individuals with greater behavioral apathy
scores show enhanced recruitment of precisely the circuits impli-
cated in the present study, including SMA and cingulate cortex,
when deciding to initiate effortful behavior (Bonnelle et al.,
2016). This is interesting because apathy correlateswith increased
effort sensitivity (E) (Bonnelle et al., 2016), and we found that
individuals with increased effort sensitivity showed enhanced re-
cruitment of SMA and brainstem regions for encoding the effort
difference (Fig. 3B). In other words, when committing to a larger
(relative) effort, these circuits were more active in people who
were more sensitive to effort. As discussed by Bonnelle et al.
(2016), we cannot infer cause and effect, but it is possible that the
neural balance between activations in reward and effort systems
might be different in individuals with greater sensitivity to efforts
(such as apathetic individuals). This may be why these people
avoid choosing effortful options more often than others. It also
provides a possible connection between the network’s specific
role in effort-based choice and its functional contribution to ev-
eryday life behaviors.
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